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Morte D'Author: An Autopsy Harvey Hix 
"it would be enough for me to know 
who is writing this" 
? W. S. Merwin 
IN 1968, ROLAND BARTHES proclaimed the death of the author in 
a manner reminiscent of Nietzsche's proclamation of the death of God. 
Yet, similarities in manner notwithstanding, the two proclamations are 
radically different in nature. Nietzsche's proclamation is an obituary; 
Barthes' is a suicide note, and an enigmatic one at that, for "this enemy of 
authors is himself preeminently an author, a writer whose varied products 
reveal a personal style and vision."1 And what is worse than the fact that 
Barthes, himself an author, proclaimed the death of the author, is that he 
proclaimed it in writing. Assent to Barthes' claim has been, not surpris 
ingly, far from universal; however, in recent years increasing attention has 
been given to the phenomenon it attempts to describe. 
In the investigation of any mysterious death, one of the first steps is nor 
mally the positive identification of the body. Yet this step seems to have 
been left out of the investigation of the death of the author. No one (in 
cluding Barthes himself as well as his detractors) seems to be sure who 
died. For this reason, I shall attempt in this paper to perform an autopsy in 
both senses of the word.2 I shall examine the author's corpse with a special 
concern to establish its identity, and I shall study the event of the author's 
death by analyzing texts relevant to it. 
Barthes only hints at the history of the author; he says that the "author 
is a modern figure" which our society produced as it discovered (under the 
influence of British empiricism, French rationalism, and the Reformation) 
"the prestige of the individual."3 Michel Foucault gives a slightly fuller ac 
count in his essay "What Is an Author?" noting two features of the 
author's history. First, in apparent agreement with Barthes' characteriza 
tion of the author as "the epitome and culmination of capitalist ideology" 
(p. 143), Foucault says: 
it was at the moment when a system of ownership and strict copy 
right rules were established (toward the end of the eighteenth and 
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beginning of the nineteenth century) that the transgressive prop 
erties always intrinsic to the act of writing became the forceful im 
perative of literature.4 
The intrinsic transgressive properties of writing result from its being "an 
action situated in a bipolar field of sacred and profane, lawful and 
unlawful, religious and blasphemous" (p. 124). It only came to be con 
sidered a product or possession to be "assigned real authors" instead of 
mythical or religious figures when "the author became subject to punish 
ment" (p. 124). The second feature Foucault points out is that the role of 
the author has changed over time. What we now call "scientific" texts 
were, in the Middle Ages, only considered truthful if they were sanctioned 
by the name of an author; however, this changed in the seventeenth and 
eighteenth centuries, according to Foucault, so that these texts came to be 
"accepted on their own merits." On the other hand, texts we now call 
"literary" were once accepted without concern for the author's identity; 
then the attitude toward literary texts shifted so that 
" 
'literary' discourse 
was 
acceptable only if it carried an author's name" (pp. 125-26). 
If Barthes and Foucault are right about the author's history, then the 
fact that the author is a modern figure raises questions about his or her 
place in larger historical movements, as well as questions about whether 
the death of the author is not merely a result of the decline of the historical 
factors that created her or him. But the history of the author is not the 
main concern of Barthes or Foucault, nor will it be my concern in this 
essay. I will mention the history of the author only in order to further my 
attempt to identify the author, just as Barthes and Foucault are interested 
in this history only insofar as it points to the fact that "in our day, literary 
works are totally dominated by the sovereignty of the author" (Foucault, 
p. 126). Barthes makes this his first real criticism. After only an introduc 
tory paragraph and brief hints at the author's history, he says: 
The author still reigns in histories of literature, biographies of 
writers, interviews, magazines, as in the very consciousness of men 
of letters anxious to unite their person and their work through 
diaries and memoirs. The image of literature to be found in ordinary 
culture is tyrannically centered on the author, his person, his life, his 
tastes, his passions ... (p. 143) 
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The attempt to dethrone the author, though, is hardly new with Barthes. 
It is easy to find examples of this project in many earlier twentieth-century 
critics. For instance, T. S. Eliot said, "The progress of an artist is a con 
tinual self-sacrifice, a continual extinction of personality."5 To the New 
Critics, the "intentional fallacy" was a mortal sin. And Northrop Frye 
says in Anatomy of Criticism: 
The absurd quantum formula of criticism, the assertion that the 
critic should confine himself to 
"getting out" of a poem exactly what 
the poet may vaguely be assumed to have been aware of "putting in," 
is one of the many slovenly illiteracies that the absence of systematic 
criticism has allowed to grow up. This quantum theory is the liter 
ary form of what may be called the fallacy of premature teleology.6 
How, then, is Barthes' proclamation of the death of the author any 
different from such statements as these? Gregory T. Polletta points out 
one way in which Barthes is different: most critics expelled authorial in 
tention "in order to ensure the correct interpretation of literary works. 
Barthes, on the other hand, excludes the author's declared intention in 
order to release the text from any authoritarian control or interpretative 
circumscription."7 Before we can isolate any further differences or evaluate 
Barthes' claim, it will be necessary to decide just who the author is. 
Traditionally, the author seems to have been credited with (and to have 
taken credit for) two primary functions: being the source of the work 
and/or the channel through which the work flows. Any random survey of 
literature will confirm this, and it is especially easy to see in the tradition of 
the invocation. The Iliad and Odyssey strongly emphasize the channel 
function. The Odyssey begins: 
Tell me, Muse, of the man of many ways, who was driven 
far journeys, after he had sacked Troy's sacred citadel. 
From some point 
here, goddess, daughter of Zeus, speak, and begin our story.8 
It is not surprising to find the bard claiming such a role in an oral tradition, 
where the story comes almost "ready-made," not only in plot but even in 
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the formulae which are the basic units of composition. Ovid's invocation 
to the Metamorphoses, though, emphasizes the author as source: 
My intention is to tell of bodies changed 
To different forms; the gods, who made these changes, 
Will help me?or I hope so?with a poem 
That runs from the world's beginning to our own days.9 
Here it is the poet who is doing the telling. The gods are only helpers; the 
poet is not even sure of their help, and capable of writing with or without 
them. In Chaucer's Troilus and Criseyde, the roles are more equal: Chaucer 
takes the poem as his project, but he also seems to need the help of 
Thesiphone. 
I have intentionally avoided questions about the purpose of the invoca 
tion because it seems fair to say that, regardless of its role within the poem, 
the invocation still points to the conception of the author as source and as 
channel.10 But there are other questions which cannot be avoided. For ex 
ample, is the bard really the author of the Odyssey? Is Chaucer himself really 
calling on Thesiphone, or has he created a persona? To account for the 
problems raised by such questions as these, and to evaluate properly "the 
death of the author," a model of the author is necessary, one which tradi 
tion will not supply. 
The following diagram represents the model of the author I propose. 
poet 
scribe 
'creative" / "created" / 
/ 
'real" / "fictional" / 
/ / / / / / 
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narrator 
proxy 
x = source axis 
y 
= channel axis 
The poet, scribe, proxy, and narrator are four "aspects" of the author, 
and are differential entities in Saussure's sense. That is, they are "defined 
not by their positive content but negatively by their relations with the 
other terms of the system. Their most precise characteristic is in being 
what the others are not."11 In any given text, it may be that not all four as 
pects of the author are present, or it may be that two of the aspects are in 
distinguishable as regards that text. It may also be the case that, for in 
stance, the poet and scribe are different people or that the poet is not a per 
son at all. With those qualifications in mind, let me offer some approx 
imate definitions and then some examples to help clarify the differences be 
tween the four aspects. 
The poet is the person to whom the work is attributed. I use the word 
poet because of its etymology; the poet is most often the person given 
credit for having made the work. The poet is the person who carries (and 
lends to the work) authority. It should be pointed out that, although for 
the sake of convenience I refer to the poet as a person, the poet (as men 
tioned above, and as the examples will show) in some cases will not be a 
person. The scribe is the historical person who wrote down the work. 
These are the two "creative" aspects of the author, and they are usually 
"real" people as compared to fictional people. 
The two "created" or "fictional" aspects of the author are the narrator 
and the proxy. The narrator, of whom critics have long been aware, is 
sometimes referred to as the persona. The narrator is a character in the 
work, and is most visible and also closest to the scribe and poet in a nar 
rative written in the first person. The proxy is what Foucault describes 
when he says: "these [facets] of an individual, which we designate as an 
author (or which comprise an individual as author), are projections, in 
terms always more or less psychological, of our ways of handling texts."12 
In other words, when we ascribe motivations, intentions, etc., to an 
author, we can only do so on the basis of the author as presented by the 
text, not on the basis of the historical author (the poet or scribe), who is, 
at least as regards the text, lost to us forever.13 Thus, the proxy is the 
"author" as created by the interaction of text and reader. 
A few examples should help to distinguish between the poet, scribe, 
proxy, and narrator, and should demonstrate the usefulness of this model 
of the author. Homer, for instance, has been a problematic case of author 
ship. Whom do we mean when we refer to Homer? Milman Parry showed 
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in the 1930s that the Iliad and Odyssey were composed orally, and since 
then the scholarly consensus seems to be that the Iliad and Odyssey were 
not 
composed by the same person, nor was either poem written down by 
the bard (or bards) who composed it.14 What is more, the fact that the 
poems were made almost entirely from formulae garnered from the long 
oral tradition blurs the distinction between the composition of the poems 
and the performance of them. It is clear that the author/text relationship 
in the Homeric poems is not simple, nor does it fit well into the "naive" 
idea of authorship. And while the model of the author I propose does not 
answer all the questions about the authorship of the Iliad and Odyssey, it 
does at least give us an improved way of describing the complex author/ 
text 
relationship. 
Since the composition of the poems appears to have been distinct from 
the writing of them,15 we can speak of the composer as the poet, and the 
writer as the scribe. In this instance, the poet could be said to include not 
only the bard (or bards) who composed the poems, but the tradition 
which provided the story and the formulae from which the poems were 
almost wholly composed. One could, of course, include in every case the 
tradition out of which a work arises as a part of what I am calling the poet. 
However, I want to avoid that on pragmatic grounds, and include the 
tradition of a work as an aspect of its author in only this and equally 
unusual cases. My only justification for including the tradition here and 
excluding it elsewhere is the intuitive sense in which the Homeric oral 
tradition is more immediately linked to the creation of the poems than, 
say, the pastoral tradition is to Lycidas. The Iliad and Odyssey apparently 
reached their respective composers in much the same condition in which a 
pre-fabricated house reaches the construction crew for final assembly. The 
poems were already in recognizable units which were simply fitted 
together. In this sense, the bard(s) who composed the Iliad was unable to 
go outside his or her tradition, while Milton could have chosen to "bewail 
a learned Friend" and "foretell the ruin of our corrrupted Clergy" in a 
non-pastoral mode.16 
Though the role of the scribe (to record the poems in writing) is easy to 
identify in the case of the Homeric poems, the scribe is as difficult to locate 
as the poet. Indeed, the scribe may not be a single person. No one knows 
when or by whom the poems were first written. Speculation has centered 
on the "Pisistratean recension"; this term refers to the "hypothetical Athe 
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nian stabilization of the text" of the poems in connection with the 
Panathenaean festival and under the supervision of Pisistratus.17 But 
scholars are unsure about Pisistratus' exact role; no one knows whether 
Pisistratus was directly involved in the process or whether he only super 
vised it, and no one knows whether or not the first official written version 
(the version produced by the Pisistratean recension) was also the first writ 
ten version of any kind. Probably for our purposes it is best to talk of 
Pisistratus as the scribe, but only in the sense that he symbolizes for us the 
process of writing down the poems. 
Homer is an unusually clear example of the distinction between the poet 
and scribe, since in the case of Homer the poet and scribe are at least two 
different people. However, it is not necessary that there be two individuals 
for there to be a distinction between the poet and scribe. For instance, 
Coleridge describes the composition of "Kubla Khan" in the following 
way: 
The Author continued for about three hours in a profound sleep, at 
least of the external senses, during which time he has the most vivid 
confidence, that he could not have composed less than from two to 
three hundred lines; if that indeed can be called composition in which 
all the images rose up before him as things, with a parallel production 
of the correspondent expressions, without any sensation or con 
sciousness of effort. On awaking he appeared to himself to have a dis 
tinct recollection of the whole, and taking his pen, ink, and paper, 
instantly and eagerly wrote down the lines that are here preserved. 
At this moment he was unfortunately called out by a person on busi 
ness . . . and on return to his room, found [that] ... all the rest had 
passed away. 
Though only one individual is involved, his state when he is acting as 
source is different enough from his state when he is acting as channel for us 
to make a clear distinction between the poet and the scribe of "Kubla 
Khan." Any significant change of state will be sufficient to make the same 
distinction. For instance, Descartes' Conversation with Burman, since it was 
apparently written down in its final form four days after the conversation 
itself, seems to be a good example of a distinction between poet and scribe 
based on scenic change. Burman acts as poet when he visits Descartes and 
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initiates the dialogue, but he does not act as scribe until four days later 
when he visits Clauberg. 
Homer, Coleridge, and Burman provide clear examples of the poet/ 
scribe distinction. But perhaps the clearest example of the proxy/narrator 
distinction is found in a satire such as Swift's A Modest Proposal. Northrop 
Frye calls satire "militant irony," that is, irony with clear moral norms, 
and with "standards against which the grotesque and absurd are 
measured." He says that irony can consistently maintain "complete real 
ism of content" and "the suppression of attitude on the part of the 
author." However, satire "demands at least a token fantasy, a content 
which the reader recognizes as grotesque, and at least an implicit moral 
standard." Frye concludes that satire 
breaks down when its content is too oppressively real to permit the 
maintaining of the fantastic or hypothetical tone. Hence satire is 
irony which is structurally close to the comic: the comic struggle of 
two societies, one normal and the other absurd, is reflected in its 
double focus of morality and fantasy.18 
This 
"struggle of two societies" could also be thought of as a struggle of 
two levels of awareness, a struggle which has been described in two 
different ways. The first way is to refer to irony as "the narrowness of a 
character's vision as revealed by the more inclusive vision shared by author 
and reader." The second way is to accord the user of ironical language "an 
awareness of irony that is not necessarily less complex than our own." 
Here 
"irony is a simultaneous awareness of contrarities by a single con 
sciousness.19 The first way, according to Everett Zimmerman, is a charac 
teristic way of explaining irony in narrative, and makes the narrator "a 
character in a tale that defines him"; the second is a characteristic way of 
explaining irony in polemic, and makes the narrator "an authorial figure 
who defines the tale."20 
On my model of the author, though, both of these ways of describing 
the struggle between two levels of awareness are captured in the nar 
rator/proxy distinction. Satire, according to this model, works on a dis 
parity between the level of awareness of the narrator and that of the proxy, 
whose level of awareness is equivalent to that of the reader. The model can 
incorporate Zimmerman's first explanation of irony if we take the narrator 
138 
and proxy as distinct individuals. If we take the narrator and proxy as the 
same individual, impersonating another (or others) in the first instance and 
as her- or himself in the next, then we have Zimmerman's second explana 
tion. We get, that is, "an image of Swift, sitting with his fellow wits in an 
Augustan drawing room . . . and personating [a Wotton, a Bentley, etc.], 
while simultaneously carrying on an ironic . . . running commentary on 
their absurdities."21 The 
"personating" Swift is the narrator and the com 
menting Swift is the proxy. 
My model works out in A Modest Proposal something like this. The nar 
rator is the "I" who offers the proposal, and the effect of the work depends 
on his being naive enough to be sincere. As Frye puts it: "one is almost led 
to feel that the narrator is not only reasonable but even humane; yet that 
'almost' can never drop out of any sane man's reaction, and as long as it re 
mains there the modest proposal will be both fantastic and immoral."22 It 
is the "almost" which creates the proxy, for though the narrator must be 
sincere for the piece to work, no sane person would believe the "author" 
to be sincere. And this "author" who is neither naive nor without ironic 
intent is the proxy.23 
The narrator and proxy do not begin as separate individuals; the first 
two paragraphs lay out the problem at hand, a problem both narrator and 
proxy are concerned with. But by the last sentence (when it is suggested 
that whoever could find a way to make the children of poor people an asset 
to the commonwealth should "have his statue set up for a preserver of the 
nation"), the author has put his tongue in his cheek by identifying with 
that great ironist Socrates. By the time the heart of the proposal is reached, 
of course, the narrator and proxy are completely separate. The narrator 
relates his discovery that a young, healthy child at a year old is "a most 
delicious, nourishing, and wholesome food," while the proxy by his very 
absence lends to this discovery its heavy satire. 
The model of the author I propose is also effective on such unusual cases 
of authorship as the pre-Socratic philosophers. The fragments of Heraclitus 
are a good example, and will help in demonstrating the usefulness of this 
model and in refining our concepts of its four main terms. In the case of 
Heraclitus, there seem to be two poets, rather than one. Heraclitus 
himself is the first, since all our sources attribute the fragments to him. 
But one of the fragments says, 
" 
It is wise, listening not to me but to the 
[logos], to agree that all things are one."24 The implication seems to be 
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that what gives Heraclitus' words their authority is their agreement with 
the logos, so that the logos is the authority behind the authority of 
Heraclitus. In other words, the logos is a second poet.25 If Heraclitus' case 
is unusual for having an auxiliary poet, then it is more unusual for having 
multiple scribes: apparently at least 28 different hands recorded one or 
more of the fragments. This is a feature which all the pre-Socratics share; 
the only extant works available for them are groups of fragments recorded 
by various scribes. 
By far the most interesting aspect of the authorship of the fragments of 
Heraclitus is the proxy, who is also the most important as an interpretive 
tool. Not only is he created by the text, as is always the case with the 
proxy, but in the case of Heraclitus the proxy himself helps to create the 
text by being one of the standards against which fragments are tested for 
authenticity. Charles Kahn's careful elucidation of his own method of 
reading Heraclitus will help make this clear.26 He makes use of two funda 
mental principles, resonance and linguistic density. His definition of these 
terms is worth quoting at length: 
By linguistic density I mean the phenomenon by which a multiplicity 
of ideas are expressed in a single word or phrase. By resonance I mean 
a 
relationship between fragments by which a single verbal theme or 
image is echoed from one text to another in such a way that the 
meaning of each is enriched when they are understood together. 
These two principles are formally complementary: resonance is one 
factor making for the density of any particular text; and conversely, 
it is because of the density of the text that resonance is possible and 
meaningful. This complementarity can be more precisely expressed 
in terms of'sign' and 'signified,' if by sign we mean the individual oc 
currence of a word or phrase in a particular text, and by signified we 
mean an idea, image, or verbal theme that may appear in different 
texts. Then density is a one-many relation between sign and signi 
fied; while resonance is a many-one relation between different texts 
and a single image or theme.27 
Resonance, Kahn says, "taken together with explicit statements of iden 
tity and connection . . . will serve to link together all the major themes of 
Heraclitus' discourse into a single network of connected thoughts" 
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(p. 90). Linguistic density makes the meaning of any one fragment "essen 
tially multiple and complex" (p. 91); that is, it makes the fragment mean 
ingfully ambiguous. 
Here the proxy enters as an interpretive tool, for Kahn says, "It will 
often be convenient to speak of deliberate or intentional ambiguity. I think 
these expressions are harmless and justified, as long as it is clearly 
understood that there is no external biographical evidence for imputing 
such intentions to Heraclitus" (p. 91). In other words, it is harmless and 
justified to speak of deliberate or intentional ambiguity as long as it is 
understood that the reference is to the intention of the proxy, not the 
poet. 
Reading the fragments with Kahn's assumptions results in "a prose 
style which fully justifies Heraclitus' reputation as 'the obscure' (ho sko 
teinos)" (p. 95). However, such a reading does not stop at creating a proxy 
with this reputation; it also forces him to live up to it. For instance, Kahn 
gives primacy to fragment L, "As they step into the same rivers, other and 
still other waters flow upon them," instead of its more celebrated counter 
part, "one cannot step twice into the same river," because the former is 
"the only statement on the river whose wording is unmistakably Heracli 
tean" (p. 167). Then, commenting on fragment CXVII,28 Kahn first 
notes its length and clarity, and then makes this comment: "The absence 
of anything enigmatic in this text might almost cast doubt on its authen 
ticity, if different portions were not cited by good and independent 
sources (Clement, and Celsus in Origen)" (p. 266). The proxy has 
developed such a reputation for obscurity and ambiguity that he is able to 
render any unambiguous text not backed by dependable sources doubtful 
or inauthentic. And he does just that to a doxographical account of the 
logos in Sextus Empiricus.29 Kahn says of the "physical identification of the 
'common logos' with the circumambient atmosphere or pneuma" that it is 
unsupported by evidence from the fragments and that 
this doctrine is also un-Heraclitean in its unambiguous precision: it 
states a psychophysical theory which happens to be false, but which 
some ancients believed to be true. But it preserves no hint of that 
poetic resonance and density that make Heraclitus' own statements 
on 
sleep profoundly meaningful for a modern reader, who can no 
longer take seriously the ancient theory stated in the commentary, 
(p. 295) 
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It seems, then, that Kahn and the fragments have created a proxy who 
could not have merely stated with "unambiguous precision" a theory now 
known to be false and no longer "profoundly meaningful for a modern 
reader." In this way the proxy is not merely shaped by the text but also 
helps to shape it simultaneously. 
With his model of the author in mind, it will now be possible to under 
take the second leg of our autopsy, an examination of texts relevant to the 
death of the author. I will focus on Barthes' "The Death of the Author" 
and William Gass' response to that work in an essay by the same name.301 
hope to show that Barthes' fundamental project is to sever the "creative" 
author (the poet and scribe) from the "created" author (the proxy and nar 
rator), while Gass attempts to reestablish their unity. 
Barthes is rebelling against a model of reading which could be compared 
to the pre-Socratic search for the arche. Aristotle says the earliest 
philosophers sought a single material principle, "that of which all things 
that are consist, the first from which they come to be, the last into which 
they are resolved." This principle is the source of all things, and is always 
conserved.31 Thus, the first step toward understanding the world is to 
locate this principle. Criticism has often taken the author to be similar to 
the arche not only in the sense of being the source of the work, but also as 
being conserved in it. Barthes, though, makes it clear in the first 
paragraph of "The Death of the Author" that he is out to show that the 
author is not conserved in the text, for he says, "Writing is the destruc 
tion of every voice, of every point of origin. Writing is that neutral, com 
posite, oblique space where our subject slips away, the negative where all 
identity is lost, starting with the very identity of the body writing" 
(p. 142). The word "writing" appears three times in this passage, and in 
the first two instances it is not clear whether Barthes means by "writing" 
a) the act of writing, or b) what is written. The word appears throughout 
the essay, and it appears with both meanings. 
In the first part of the essay, Barthes seems to concenrate on the first 
meaning. He mentions several writers who have tried to loosen "the sway 
of the Author," beginning with Mallarm?, who, Barthes says, recognized 
that "it is language which speaks, not the author" (p. 143). The reference 
is to the act of writing, for Barthes continues, "to write is ... to reach 
that point where only language acts, 'performs,' and not 'me' 
" 
(p. 143). 
Barthes cites as further examples Val?ry and Proust, then mentions Sur 
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realism, which "contributed to the desacrilization of the image of the 
Author by ceaselessly recommending the abrupt disappointment of expec 
tations of meaning (the famous surrealist 'jolt'), by entrusting the hand 
with the task of writing as quickly as possible what the head itself is 
unaware of" (p. 144). Again, the focus is on the act of writing. Here, 
though, the focus begins to shift. Barthes says that modern linguistics has 
shown that "the whole of enunciation is an empty process, functioning 
perfectly without there being any need for it to be filled with the person of 
the interlocutors" (p. 145). Barthes takes this to mean that the action is 
separated from the actor. The author is no longer "the past of his own 
book." The temporality of writing is different; "every text is eternally 
written here and now." This means that Barthes is free to conflate writing 
(act) and writing (what is written); there is no longer any difference. And, 
more importantly for Barthes, it means that only writings can write, not 
authors. The author's 
"only power is to mix writings, to counter the ones 
with others" (p. 146). Now "writing . . . can know no halt: life never 
does more than imitate the book, and the book itself is only a tissue of 
signs, an imitation that is lost, infinitely deferred" (p. 147). Barthes' shift 
of the meaning of the word "writing" is now complete: "writing can no 
longer designate an operation of recording, notation, representation, 'de 
piction' (as the Classics would say)" (p. 145); instead, it should supplant 
the world "literature" (p. 147). 
Now Gregory Polletta's statement, quoted above, explaining how 
Barthes' "death of the author" differs from other attempts to dethrone the 
author, is clearer. Barthes releases the text "from any authoritarian con 
trol" by releasing it from the hands of the "Author-God" into the hands of 
the reader, and he relegates the author to the rank of "scriptor." He says: 
In the multiplicity of writing, everything is to be disentangled, 
nothing deciphered; the structure can be followed, 'run' (like the 
thread of a stocking) at every point and at every level, but there is 
nothing beneath: the space of writing is to be ranged over, not 
pierced; writing ceaselessly posits meaning ceaselessly to evaporate it. 
(p. 147) 
Previously, the text was a cloth to be unraveled by the reader; if the cloth 
were unwound all the way, the reader would find the author holding the 
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other end. But Barthes makes the text into a shroud, and no one, not even 
a corpse, is holding the other end. The Author-God has not been resur 
rected; he or she has simply disappeared. In terms of my model of the 
author, Barthes completely separates the two "real" aspects of the author 
(the poet and scribe) from the two "fictional" aspects (the proxy and nar 
rator). More importantly, though (and this is what prompts him to speak 
of the "death of the 
author"), he says the "real" aspects of the author are 
fictional and the "fictional" aspects are the only real ones. That is, he 
denies any real creative power to the "creative" author, who has become 
for Barthes 
"only a ready-formed dictionary," "never more than the in 
stance writing."32 The poet and scribe, to the extent that they are real, are 
completely severed from the text; only the proxy and narrator remain, and 
they are at the mercy of the reader. 
William Gass, however, rejects this conclusion. He affirms the creative 
power of the author, and attempts to reunite the "creative" and "created" 
aspects of the author. Gass begins by criticizing the comparison of the 
death of the author with the death of god; not only is there a disanalogy, 
he says, but the "two expressions are metaphors which are the reverse of 
one another." The death of god implies that gods have never existed and 
that belief in god "is no longer even irrationally possible" (p. 3). But the 
death of the author 
"signifies a decline in authority, in theological power, 
as if Zeus were stripped of his thunderbolts and swans, perhaps residing on 
Olympus still, but now living in a camper and cooking with propane. He 
is, but he is no longer a god" (p. 3). Gass quotes John Crowe Ransom's 
statement, from an essay about Lycidas, that "Anonymity, of some real if 
not literal sort, is a condition of poetry," and makes the important point 
that "In this case the arrogance, the overbearing presence, of the author is 
at one with his disappearance" (p. 4). It is the act of writing which is the 
"essental artistic task," and if the author hides, it is only so that the reader 
will seek. The hiding is a ploy, as in Moll Flanders, Gulliver's Travels, and 
The History of Henry Esmond: 
These novels have authors, to be sure, but they are artificial ones, 
replacement pens or "dildoes." Still, no one will imagine that Defoe 
or Swift or Thackeray felt that by placing these fictions in front of 
themselves they were risking their lives. No one is done in by a dil 
doe . . . These artful dodges (and it would be awful if they fooled 
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anyone) strengthen the concepts of source and voice and purpose, 
control and occasion, which are central to the notion of a command 
ing creator, (pp. 6-7) 
Gass' point, which he takes several more pages to develop, is that "the ele 
vation or removal of the author is a social and political gesture, not an aes 
thetic one" (p. 11). The level of a work's anonymity has no bearing on the 
work's quality, and, Gass says, it certainly doesn't mean that no one did it. 
Even authors who deliberately efface themselves are creators. 
What does happen, according to Gass, is that in removing him- or her 
self from the text, an author also removes the reader; "if no one has writ 
ten or posted the word, then no one is addressed by the word" (p. 13). 
Still, even in removing the self, an author "does not omit to leave his sig 
nature behind, just the same. Indeed he not only signs every sheet, he signs 
every word" (p. 14). This is how writing differs from speech, and as Gass 
sees it, this is what makes an author an author.33 There are many author 
less texts, such as a grocery sacker mindlessly saying, under orders of the 
store manager, "Have a nice day." No one authors those words, Gass say, 
but "It is necessary to say we author what we write precisely because what 
we write is disconnected from any mouth we might actually observe" (p. 
19). It is the ability to create, not merely regurgitate texts previously in 
gested, which defines the author for Gass, and the absence of the author 
from the text in no way diminishes this. The person of the author, 
whether discovered or not, still determines the quality of the work: 
"literally millions of sentences are penned or typed or spoken every day 
which have only a source?a spigot or a signboard?and not an author" 
(p. 24). Gass ends his article by saying that authors "re-fuse," while 
readers 
"simply comprise the public" (p. 26). 
Gass' last-second insult against his audience is perhaps the most pointed 
example of the primary difference between himself and Barthes. Barthes 
privileges the "created" author, over the "creative" author, which makes 
the reader a powerful figure. Gass, on the other hand, privileges the 
"creative" author, and makes the reader almost powerless. 
Both Barthes and Gass recognize a distinction between the creative 
author and the created author. Barthes, as mentioned above, makes a sub 
tle transition between writing as an act and writing as what is written, 
during which the "Author" (creative) is replace by the "scriptor" (created 
author): 
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The Author, when believed in, is always conceived of as the past of 
his own book. ... In complete contrast, the modern scriptor is born 
simultaneously with the text, is in no way equipped with a being 
preceding or exceeding the writing, is not the subject of the book as 
predicate, (p. 145) 
Gass is aware of the same distinction. He talks at some length about the 
poet the reader projects from the poem, and he makes it clear that this pro 
jected poet is not a person, "but the poet of the poem." He mentions 
Hume's warning that if we are to infer a creator from the evidence of a 
creation, we can only attribute to it what would be necessary to produce 
that creation. This means that the author's name designates not the "per 
sonality behind the art, but . . . another kind of slippery fiction." And, 
if we believe at all in the Unconscious, or in the impossibility of 
literally nothing escaping the author's clear awareness and control, 
then the artificial author (the author which the text creates, not the 
author who creates the text) will be importantly different from the 
one of flesh and blood, envy and animosity, who holds the pen, and 
whose picture enlivens the gray pages of history, (p. 21) 
Barthes' privileging of the created author is the clue to what he means 
by "the death of the author." Barthes observes, quite correctly, that the 
reader, encountering a text, has access only to the proxy and narrator, not 
the poet and scribe. But Barthes errs synechdochically; he concludes that 
because the poet and scribe are "dead" (i.e., separated forever from the 
text), the whole author, including the proxy and narrator, is dead, he 
would perhaps escape this charge if he were consistent in using the term 
"author" to refer only to the poet and scribe, and kept his use of "author" 
always distinct from his use of "scriptor." But his discussion on pp. 143ff. 
of Mallarm?, Val?ry, Proust, et. al. is inconsistent wih his own claims: he 
clearly refers to creative authors in their relations to the texts they created, 
and he refers to them as if they were not "dead."34 
Gass also speaks of creative authors as if they were not dead, but in do 
ing so he does not violate his claims, since he is trying to show that Barthes 
is wrong. Gass directs attention to his own crime, though, with this criti 
cism of Barthes: 
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If Roland Barthes had been interested in radically simplifying the 
final solution to the Author Question ... he could have adopted the 
"single author" theory. . . . Then, with this plurality of persons 
? 
both real, inhuman, artificial, and imaginary?reduced to manage 
able proportions, a single stroke across the top of the word would 
have been enough, (p. 23) 
The implication is not that Barthes could have made authors homogeneous, 
but that he did make authors homogeneous. Unfortunately, Gass is guilty 
of the same sin in reverse: he affirms the heterogeneity of authors, but he 
makes readers homogeneous. 
Of course neither authors nor readers are homogeneous, and the answer 
to the question of the death of the author will not be found by choosing 
sides. The relationships between authors, their texts, and the readers of 
their texts vary greatly, but it should be clear by now that there is always a 
mutual interdependence. The author is dead in the limited sense that the 
poet and scribe are forever removed from the text and the reader as soon as 
the creative act is finished. But the author is dead 
only in that sense, for the 
author includes that proxy and narrator as well as the poet and scribe, and 
these are created as much by the reader as by the poet. 
Barthes and Gass both take the question of the death of the author as a 
theological question, so it is only fitting that our autopsy end with a meta 
phor taken from religion. Barthes and Gass agree that the author is no 
longer a god. However, as our autopsy has shown, the author is at least a 
human, with a body (the creative author) and a soul (the created author). 
Viewed in this way, Barthes' claim seems to be that the author has died 
and there is no afterlife; Gass, on the other hand, seems to claim that there 
is an afterlife for the author?with a bodily resurrection. I think our au 
topsy, though, points to a via media: the author's body has died; there is 
an afterlife; the author's soul lives on. 
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